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Abstract The intensity of use hypothesis is widely used
both as an explanation of trends in materials consumption
over time and as a predictive tool. The paper examines
significant weaknesses in the data normally used to test
the hypothesis. An examination of long-term trends in the
intensity of apparent first use of aluminium, copper and
steel in eight countries shows a tendency for usage per
unit of GDP to follow an inverted U shape as per capita
GDP increases. Cross country comparisons for individual
years do not demonstrate such a relationship. Apparent
first uses are not always good guides to actual consump-
tion, and the weaknesses in the data are discussed. Per
capita GDP is only one influence on materials usage,
and the paper looks at other factors, and most notably at
the structure of both output and expenditure. China’s in-
tensity of use appears anomalous, raising questions about
future trends in its materials usage. Avenues for future
research are outlined.
Keywords Intensity . Hypothesis . Consumption
Introduction
The intensity of use hypothesis1 states that there is an inverted
U-shaped relationship between the amount of a material used
per unit of output, or its intensity of use, and the level of
economic development, as reflected in gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita. The existence of such a relationship was
first suggested by Wilfred Malenbaum in the context of steel
demand.2 BAt the early stages of economic growth when per
capita income levels are low, material requirements are also
low, for such economies are based largely on unmechanized
agriculture. As industrialization occurs, manufacturing, con-
struction, and other material-intensive activities expand. As
development continues, however, the need for houses, facto-
ries, roads, automobiles, and machinery gradually is satisfied,
and consumer demand increasingly shifts toward services.
The service sector, it is argued, is less material-intensive than
the manufacturing and construction sectors, so this shift in
consumer demand leads first to a slowing and eventually to
a reversal in the upward rise in intensity of metal use as per
capita income advances.^3
The hypothesis is widely used both as an explanation of
trends in materials consumption over time and as a predictive
tool. It has been tested on a range of metals over different time
periods with a variety of statistical techniques. Nearly all these
published studies look at trends in the intensity of first use of
1 Also known as the material Kuznets Curve.
2 International Iron and Steel Institute (1972), Projection 85: World Steel
Demand, Brussels, 1972.
Malenbaum (1978). World Demand for Raw Materials in 1985 and 2000,
McGraw-Hill, New York.
3 Radetzki and Tilton (1990), in World Metal Demand: Trends and Prospects,
Resources for the Future, Washington.
Foreword
This paper is respectfully and affectionately dedicated toMarian Radetzki
as he approaches his 81st year. Age cannot wither, nor custom stale, his
infinite variety of interests in the energy and mineral industries (with
apologies to William Shakespeare).
* Phillip Crowson
phillip.crowson@btinternet.com
1 Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy,
University of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland
2 3 Albany Close, Reigate, Surrey RH2 9PP, UK
Miner Econ
DOI 10.1007/s13563-017-0113-z
individual metals in a variety of developed countries from the
1970s onwards.4 It would be invidious to single out any one
study, but this paper argues that the underlying foundations of
data on which most are based are inherently weak. This paper
is not concerned with elaborating the underlying theory, nor in
developing appropriate statistical tests. No matter how statis-
tically significant relationships may appear, their economic
significance may be poor. They cover too short a time span,
ignore important structural changes in trading relationships of
recent decades and first use may be a poor guide to true usage
within an economy for a variety of reasons.
The paper starts off by setting the scene in showing long-
term trends in the intensity of first use of aluminium, copper
and crude steel for selected countries over a much longer time
period than other studies have used. It then makes cross-
sectional comparisons across countries for finished steel and
cement before going on to examine the various weaknesses in
the generally used data for metals usage, with reference to
aluminium, copper and steel. It then looks at some of the
factors that may complicate any simple relationship between
usage of materials per unit of GDP and per capita incomes, as
reflected in GDP per head. The broad conclusion is that, with
the present limitations of data, the explanatory power of the
intensity of use hypothesis is limited and that it cannot be a
reliable tool for forecasting. The paper concludes with some
suggestions for further research to improve the basic data and
to elaborate the simple hypothesis.
Longer-term trends in aluminium, copper and steel
In examining the longer-term trends, it is tempting to concen-
trate on developed economies for which the published data are
generally more comprehensive than for other nations. Many
of the cited studies do concentrate on such countries.
Unfortunately, the progressive economic integration of
European economies since the signature of the Treaty of
Rome in 1958 means that their usage of primary materials,
the starting point for analysis, has become increasingly di-
vorced in some instances from their final consumption of
those materials. The UK’s negligible usage of 23,000 tonnes5
of refined copper in 2015, for example, does not accurately
measure the amount of copper actually used in the country.
Analyses for individual European countries will all have been
distorted in varying degrees by their progressive integration,
and this distortion is generally not picked up by any of the
published studies. The same difficulties do not apply to Japan
or the USA to anything like the same extent.
Another concern is the time span of many studies, most of
which go back only to 1970, or the late 1960s. The per capita
incomes of most developed economies and, indeed, of many
emerging or developing countries, and their usage of materials
per unit of output were then already well advanced.
Subsequent trends seldom capture the full progression of ma-
terials usage relative to per capita incomes and longer time
series are needed not only for developed economies but also
for other nations.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the relationship between per capita
GDP in constant prices and the usage of primary aluminium
(Fig. 1), crude steel (Fig. 2) and refined copper metal (Fig. 3)
per unit of GDP for eight countries. These are the USA, Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, China, Malaysia, Brazil and Mexico. The
sources and methodology are described in Appendix A.
The data for primary aluminium go back to 1900 for the
USA, 1960 for Korea and Malaysia, and 1950 for the remain-
ing countries. Those for refined copper also go back to 1900
for the USA and 1950 for Japan, Brazil, Mexico and China.
They go from 1951 for Korea and Taiwan and 1980 for
Malaysia. The figures for crude steel extend back to 1875
for the USA, 1924 for Japan and Mexico, 1930 for Brazil,
1950 for China, 1951 for Taiwan, 1955 for Korea and 1967
for Malaysia. The series for each country is based on figures
for GDP and GDP per capita in national currencies at constant
2010 prices. For comparative purposes, these are converted
into US dollars at 2010’s official exchange rates.
The patterns of usage vary considerably both between the
metals and between countries. The tendency for usage per unit
of GDP to follow an inverted U shape is, however, apparent
for the three metals and most of the countries. Both the USA
and Japan display similar trends in usage per unit of output for
the three metals, although Japan’s steel usage per unit of out-
put did not reach the same heights as in the USA. The peaks in
both countries’ usage of primary aluminium came at much
higher levels of per capita income than their peaks in copper
and steel. The performance of the remaining four Asian econ-
omies has differed markedly from that of the two Latin
American nations. Malaysia appears to have experienced a
much steeper rise in usage per unit of output than Brazil or
Mexico, and a more precipitate decline. In Taiwan and Korea,
peak usage of copper and steel came at higher per capita in-
comes than in the USA. Chinese and Taiwanese usage of all
three metals per unit of output has greatly exceeded that of the
other countries at similar levels of per capita GDP. China also
appears to be at a relatively early stage of the transition, espe-
cially for aluminium.
Gross domestic product per capita
Over the long periods covered the composition of per capita
GDP has changed radically. The goods and services produced
4 Inter alia Roberts (1996); Canas et al. (2003); Guzmán et al. (2005); Focacci
(2005, 2007) Wårell and Olsson (2009); Jaunky (2012); Wårell (2014).
5 World Metal Statistics Yearbook 2016, World Bureau of Metal Statistics,
Ware, Hertfordshire, United Kingdom.
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and consumed 50 years ago were markedly different in all
cases from the present baskets. We shall explore some of the
implications later.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 use official exchange rates to convert
trends in national currencies to US dollars. These do not al-
ways adequately reflect differences in local purchasing power.
In general, price levels are much lower in most countries and a
dollar buys a bigger basket of goods than in the USA.
Purchasing power parity (ppp) exchange rates, by contrast,
aim to adjust for differences in price levels that are not
reflected in the official rates and provide more realistic com-
parisons of GDP across countries. As Table 1 shows, usage
per unit of GDP is lower and per capita incomes are higher in
ppp dollar rates than at official rates. The table gives index
numbers based on the US level as 100 in each column. Thus
China’s GDP per head was only 14.3% of the US level at
official exchange rates in 2015, but 25.2% at ppp rates.
Using ppp exchange rates will not affect individual coun-
tries’ trends in intensity over time, but it does narrow some of
the gaps between them.
Intercountry comparisons
One corollary of the tendency for intensity of use to vary with
the state of economic development is that a similar inverted U-
shaped curve should be apparent from cross-sectional com-
parisons between countries. Figures 4 and 5, which plot the
comparative intensity of finished steel usage and cement pro-
duction against per capita GDP for a wide range of countries,
using ppp exchange rates, show that there is a wide scatter,
with no obvious tendency to cluster around an inverted U-
shaped curve for either material. Again the sources and meth-
odology are discussed in Appendix A. Production is a reason-
able approximation for cement usage because of limited inter-
national trade.
The patterns are very different for the two products, dem-
onstrating that each product needs separate analysis and that
there is no standard model to describe all materials. The wide
scatter not only reflects differences in the natural resource
usage of individual countries but it also highlights some of
the weaknesses both of international comparisons and of the
intensity of use hypothesis. It is these to which we now turn.
Deficiencies in the data
Most analyses of intensity of use are based on first uses of
primary metal such as crude steel or refined copper rather than
on the amounts of a material actually used in final products
within a country. There are several complications. First, the
contribution of most secondary materials to usage is not taken
into account. Whereas most steel scrap is reprocessed into
crude metal that is not the case with many other metals.
Certainly, some copper scrap is used in secondary refineries,
but by no means all, and primary aluminium is different from
secondary aluminium. The shares of unrefined secondary ma-
terials in total usage vary widely, both over time and between
different countries. In the global copper industry, for example,
such directly melted scrap accounted for 24% of total copper
usage in 2007 and 18% in 2013.6 The contribution of scrap
tends to be much higher in mature than in developing econo-
mies which lack such large inventories of material in use.
Unfortunately, the available data are insufficient to show
long-run trends in total usage for each country.
Estimates of apparent usage of metals take no account of
changes in rawmaterial inventories throughout the production
chain. Over the longer-term swings in such inventories are
likely to balance out. From one year to another, however,
changes in apparent usage are likely to differ from shifts in
genuine usage because of such inventory movements.
Moreover, as apparent usage is normally taken as production
plus net trade no adjustment is made for the build-up of any
unrecorded stocks. This means that annual usage may be con-
sistently over-estimated, particularly in China, but also possi-
bly in Korea and Malaysia which host London Metal
Exchange warehouse companies that may also store off-
warrant metal which is generally not recorded.
The first users of primary metals may not only use directly
melted scrap but also they create scrap in their production
processes. This may be reused within the same manufacturing
plants or sent for reprocessing. Consumption of primary metal
in finished products will thus differ from the usage of the
primary metals. In this context, finished products mean the
semi-fabricated products such as castings, bars, ingots, sheet,
rod, wire and other shapes that are used in manufacturing
6 Source: The World Copper Factbook 2015, International Copper Study
Group, Lisbon.
Table 1 Comparative GDP/head and steel usage per unit of GDP in
2015 at official and ppp dollar exchange rates, based on the US levels as
100
GDP/head $ Steel/GDP (grams per $)
Official PPP Official PPP
Japan 58.9 68.0 298.7 258.5
Korea 48.5 65.3 778.8 579.0
Taiwan 39.7 83.5 743.3 353.4
Brazil 15.2 27.4 246.3 136.5
Mexico 16.1 31.3 465.7 238.8
China 14.3 25.2 1175.0 666.7
Malaysia 17.4 48.0 725.4 262.7
Source: see Appendix A
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rather than the metal contained in final uses. Changes in fab-
ricating techniques will alter the relationship between the us-
age of crude metal and finished metal products. For example,
the introduction of continuous casting reduced the amount of
crude metals required to produce bars and rods. Furthermore,
there is considerable trade in semi-finished metals which
should be taken into account when looking at the genuine
usage of metal within a country. The World Steel
Association’s estimates of the apparent usage of finished steel
take such trade into account.
Table 2 shows how the apparent usage of finished steel has
moved as a percentage of crude steel usage in Japan, Korea
and China since 1974. In general, the apparent consumption of
crude steel, the basis of Fig. 1, has risen less than apparent
finished usage, the basis of Fig. 5.
Similar data are not available for earlier years or for other
metals. The statistics of trade in semi-manufactures of both
aluminium and copper include not just pure metal but also
alloys containing varying proportions of the primary metal.
Nonetheless, Tables 3 and 4 show the approximate importance
of trade in semi-manufactures of bothmetals in 2001 and 2015
for the countries coverd by Figs. 1,2 and 3.
The net trade in aluminium semis includes aluminium alloy
semis, regardless of aluminium content. In the case of copper,
it is arbitrarily assumed that copper alloy semis contain 80%
copper. Trade in copper wire rod is included.
Brazil, Japan, Korea and Taiwan have been net ex-
porters of both aluminium and copper semi-manufactures,
whereas Mexico is a sizeable net importer. China has
swung from being a net importer to an exporter of alu-
minium semis, and its net imports of copper semis have
contracted. Conversely, the USA has moved from being a
net exporter to a net importer of aluminium semis and its
net exports of copper semis have shrunk. For all countries
the intensity of use, adjusted for trade in semis, has shown
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Table 2 Apparent
finished steel usage as a
percentage of crude steel
usage, 1974–2014
Japan Korea China
1974 88.8 61.2 76.9
1984 92.9 84.2 77.9
1994 81.8 94.8 86.5
2004 95.4 96.2 93.0
2014 92.8 96.0 96.0
Sources: Steel Statistical Yearbooks,
World Steel Association, Brussels
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different trends from the unadjusted totals used in Figs. 1,
2 and 3.
Even making allowance for trade in semi-manufactures
does not fully adjust the data to reflect purely domestic usage
as some metal will be incorporated into exports of manufac-
tures. The World Steel Association does estimate true steel
usage, after adjusting for steel incorporated in exports of
manufactured goods. Accordingly, Table 5 compares true
and apparent usage of finished steel in 2002 and 2014 for
our selected countries. Earlier data are not available.
Such indirect exports might possibly be regarded as domes-
tic usage as they reflect each country’s economic structure and
level of economic development. Yet they do not satisfy do-
mestic needs so that there is no reason why they should rise
with per capita incomes. The economies of Korea, Japan and
Taiwan are based on exports of manufactures and they will
consequently have different patterns of consumption from a
country like Brazil. Even ignoring indirect exports, however,
the previous comments show that the measures of usage or
consumption used in most studies of the intensity of use of
metals do not properly reflect the true trends in domestic
offtake of materials. The various deficiencies highlighted in
Table 4 Copper: refined use, net trade in semis and domestic use, ‘000 tonnes
2001 2015
Refined
use
Net trade
in semis
Domestic
use
Ratio of domestic
to refined
Refined
use
Net trade
in semis
Domestic
use
Ratio of domestic
to refined
Brazil 336.1 −27.4 308.7 0.92 433.8 −4.6 429.2 0.99
Mexico 421.0 61.5 482.5 1.15 345.0 261.3 606.3 1.76
China 2357.1 720.0 3077.1 1.31 11,353.1 280.9 11,634.0 1.02
Japan 1146.3 −231.3 915.0 0.80 997.5 −156.8 840.7 0.84
Korea 836.0 −431.7 404.3 0.48 704.9 −254.7 450.2 0.64
Malaysia 160.2 41.0 201.2 1.26 239.0 −63.7 175.3 0.73
Taiwan 540.0 −209.2 330.8 0.61 470.9 −227.3 243.6 0.52
USA 2620.0 466.5 3086.5 1.18 1789.0 17.5 1806.5 1.01
Source: World Bureau of Metal Statistics and US Geological Survey
Table 5 True usage as a
percentage of apparent
usage of finished steel
2002 2014
Brazil 95.4 109.1
Mexico 105.1 86.1
China 94.6 92.2
Japan 75.4 77.0
Korea 75.1 70.8
Malaysia 105.1 86.1
Taiwan 86.9 85.2
USA 104.8 101.8
Sources: Steel Statistical Yearbooks,
World Steel Association, Brussels
Table 3 Aluminium: primary use, net trade in semis and domestic use, ‘000 tonnes
2001 2015
Primary
use
Net trade
in semis
Domestic
use
Ratio of domestic
to primary
Primary
use
Net trade
in semis
Domestic
use
Ratio of domestic
to primary
Brazil 552.8 −116.6 436.3 0.79 801.2 −97.6 703.6 0.88
Mexico 113.1 323.2 436.3 3.86 183.9 604.2 788.1 4.29
China 3492.2 247.1 3739.4 1.07 31,068.1 −3796.6 27,271.5 0.88
Japan 2014.0 −212.7 1801.2 0.89 1778.7 −199.7 1579.0 0.89
Korea 849.6 −110.4 739.2 0.87 1365.8 −240.7 1125.1 0.82
Malaysia 152.5 152.5 482.3 482.3
Taiwan 321.3 −1.9 319.4 0.99 540.5 −15.1 525.4 0.97
USA 5720.0 32.1 5752.1 1.01 5220.0 −263.1 4956.9 0.95
Source: World Bureau of Metal Statistics and US Geological Survey
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the data are probably more important than the methods used to
calculate what may appear to be statistically significant rela-
tionships between per capita GDP and intensity of use.
The nature of the relationship between materials
usage and per capita incomes
There is an implicit assumption in the simple model that the
relationship between intensity of use and per capita GDP is
stable. Relative factor endowments, changes in the pattern of
demand, substitution between materials, and above all chang-
ing technology will, however, influence the intensity of use.
The consequence of the many influences on demand is that
intensity of use is liable to shift over time relative to the simple
theoretical model. There will be a family of intensity of use
curves for each material rather than just one; each based on a
given state of technology. The observed data, whether from
individual countries over time, or from cross-sectional analy-
ses, will come from different curves.7
Substitution and the application of new technology can
swamp the impact on intensity of use of the long-term struc-
tural changes in the nature of economic activity that underpin
the intensity of use hypothesis. Shifts between different curves
can be at least as important as movements along the curve as
per capita incomes increase. As newer technologies tend to be
less materials-intensive than those they replace, the general
tendency might be for the observed relationship to shift down-
wards over time. Technological change and substitution do
not proceed steadily in step with changes in per capita income,
but in fits and jerks. Moreover, not all innovations lead to
falling usage of materials, but they can boost the specific con-
sumption of apparently mature materials. This means that
some developments will raise observed intensity of use. The
specific usage of copper in automobiles, for example, which
was trending downwards in the 1970s and 1980s, has been
boosted by the electrification of previously manual operations
and by the development of electric vehicles.
Countries at different stages of development will not
follow an identical economic path, but will naturally
adopt the latest available and lowest-cost technology, re-
gardless of the paths followed by other countries. As
Figs. 1, 2 and 3 clearly show, intensities of use have
followed radically different paths in different countries,
with no tendency for later developers to show the same
levels of intensity as more mature economies like the
USA and Japan. This runs contrary to the previous par-
agraphs which imply that their usage per unit of GDP
should be lower rather than higher at given levels of per
capita GDP.
We have already noted, in the context of Table 5, that the
nature of their productive activities and the structure of their
economies will affect each country’s intensity of use of par-
ticular materials. The economies of Korea and Taiwan, fol-
lowing the earlier example of Japan, have been biased towards
the export of metal-based manufactures. Malaysia followed a
similar route in the 1990s. China has also rapidly developed its
manufacturing sector. Table 6 shows the shares of manufactur-
ing in GDP and in exports for the selected countries in 2000
and 2015.
Those countries with the highest shares of manufacturing
in GDP will tend to use more metals per unit of GDP than
countries, like Brazil, with much lower shares.
Concentration on the relationship between per capita in-
comes and intensity of use tends to overlook the importance
of a country’s geographical area and population in driving its
patterns of demand. Proportionally, more infrastructures of all
types will probably be required in larger than in smaller coun-
tries to service a given level of per capita income, regardless of
their levels of development. Table 7 accordingly compares
land areas and populations for our sample of countries.
Obviously land area alone is a very coarse measure of a
country’s size, as the proportion of usable land varies widely.
Much of Brazil, for example, is still tropical forest. Moreover,
size is not everything, as witnessed by Korea and Taiwan. It
should not, however, be completely overlooked when exam-
ining materials usage. China’s large size and population may
well partially explain why its intensity of use appears very
high at low levels of per capita income in Figs. 1, 2 and 3.
Another very important factor is the way in which GDP is
allocated between different types of expenditure. Spending on
construction and infrastructure is more materials-intensive
than other categories of expenditure apart from military hard-
ware and consumer durables. Accordingly, the intensity of use
of metals, and especially of the three covered in this paper,
will be strongly influenced by levels of investment, by the
share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP. This is shown
for 2000 and 2015 in Table 8 for our sample.
In all countries save China, the shares were lower in 2015
than in 2000. The two extremes are the relatively low share of
investment in Brazil and the very high share in China. The
tendency of developing economies to devote a high share of
income to investment in the early stages of economic growth
and then switch more to consumption underpins the intensity
of use hypothesis. China has not yet made that transition and
its heavy bias towards capital expenditure helps explain trends
in its intensity of use of materials.
Figure 6 relates the usage of crude steel not to GDP but to
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). It compares total usage of
crude steel per unit of GFCF with GFCF per capita from 1960
onwards for all the sample countries except the USA. Taiwan’s
pattern differs frommost others for much of the period, probably
in reflection of its dependence on the export of manufactures.
0 See Radetzki and Tilton (1990) in World Metal Demand: Trends and
Prospects, edited by J Tilton. Resources for the Future, Washington.
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On this admittedly arbitrary basis, China’s experience
above very low levels of GFCF per capita has been much
more in line with other countries’ experience. The importance
of capital spending to China’s steel usage is highlighted by
Fig. 7 which gives index numbers, based on 1990 as 100, of
the development of usage per unit of GDP and of GFCF an-
nually since 1960. Both series show cyclical fluctuations, but
the latter has trended downwards from the late 1960s, whereas
usage per unit of GDP has followed a different path.
Concluding comments
The paper has solely examined historical data and has not
strayed into prediction. It does, however, implicitly raise ques-
tions about future trends in materials usage, particularly in
China. One important message is that projections based on
simple relationships between usage and per capita GDP, al-
though often used, are likely to prove misleading.
More immediately, the paper’s main thrust has been to draw
attention to the many deficiencies in the basic data that are
normally employed to illustrate and confirm the intensity of
use hypothesis, no matter how sophisticated the statistical
techniques used. It has also pointed out that the progression of
per capita income is only one influence on the development of
materials usage. Many of the other influences may not be direct-
ly, if at all, correlated with per capita GDP. If the intensity of use
hypothesis is to become anything more than an expositional
device there is a need to broaden analysis to include more var-
iables than per capita incomes. This paper has highlighted sev-
eral possibilities that might offer avenues for detailed research.
Research is also needed to determine the full impact of
European integration on materials usage in the European
Union’s individual member countries. This would not pose
such a problem if the basis of analysis could be widened from
first use to account for the various complications discussed in
the paper. Although trawling through statistical archives is
often boring and time-consuming that is essential in order to
provide a sounder basis for analysis than reliance on the first
use of metals over the past 30 or 40 years. Certainly, as shown
in Figs. 1, 2 and 3, it is possible to take the data back much
further than is usually done by examining historical trade and
production statistics for individual countries. Some of the oth-
er weaknesses identified can also be remedied, at least partial-
ly, by detailed research into the available data. That this is not
always readily accessible, and is rarely digitalised, is a chal-
lenge rather than an insuperable barrier.
Table 6 Percentage shares of
manufacturing in GDP and
exports, 2000 and 2015
Share of manufacturing in GDP Share of manufacturing in exports
Brazil 15 11 58 38
Mexico 20 18 83 83
China 32 30 88 94
Japan 20 18 94 88
Korea 29 29 91 90
Malaysia 31 23 80 67
Taiwan 26 30 n.a. n.a.
USA 16 12 83 64
Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank, and National Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan)
n.a. not available
Table 7 Land area and population in 2015
Land area (‘000 sq. km.) Population (millions)
Brazil 8512 208
Mexico 1973 127
China 9561 1371
Japan 378 127
Korea 99 51
Malaysia 333 30
Taiwan 36 23
USA 9373 322
Sources: Pocket World in Figures, 2010 Edition, The Economist (2010),
London, and World Economic Outlook Database October 2015,
International Monetary Fund, Washington
Table 8 Percentage
shares of gross fixed
capital formation in
GDP, 2000 and 2015
2000 2015
Brazil 19 18
Mexico 23 23
China 34 46
Japan 27 24
Korea 33 28
Malaysia 27 25
Taiwan 26 21
USA 24 20
Sources: World Development Indicators,
World Bank, and National Statistics,
Republic of China (Taiwan)
P. Crowson
Appendix A
Sources and Methods
The paper has drawn on a wide range of sources for the data
underlying the figures.
Figures 1, 2, and 3: USmetals usage from the US Geological
Survey’s Historical Statistics for Mineral and Material
Commodities in the USA, data series 140. https://minerals.usgs.
gov/minerals/pubs/ds05-140/. GDP and per capita GDP from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (2017) National Income
and Product(NIPA) tables and from Historical Statistics of the
United States, and population from the Bureau of the Census.
Other countries’ apparent usage of crude steel, finished
steel and true usage from successive Steel Statistical
Yearbooks of the World Steel Association (n.d.). The data
only go back to 1969. For earlier years’ estimates of apparent
crude steel usage are made from the statistics on production,
imports and exports contained in successive issues of the
Statistical Summary of the Mineral Industry, World
Production, Exports and Imports, and its predecessors pub-
lished by the Institute of Geological Sciences (IGS) [now
British Geological Survey BGS)], London.
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/statistics/worldArchive.
html.
Usage of refined copper from 1950 from Metallstatistik
(n.d.), successive issues, Metallgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt, and
International Copper Study Group (n.d., 2016), Lisbon. Earlier
years estimated from production and net trade from IGS/BGS,
as for steel.
Usage of primary aluminium from World Metal Statistics
Yearbooks, successive issues, World Bureau of Metal
Statistics, Ware, England, and from Metallstatistik (n.d.), suc-
cessive issues, Metallgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt., with earlier
years from IGS/BGS.
Population back to 1960 fromWorldDevelopment Indicators,
World Bank, Washington (www.worldbank.org), and World
Economic Outlook Database, successive issues, International
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Intensity of use reexamined
Monetary Fund. Washington (www.imf.org). Data for earlier
years come from www.Worldometer.info/world-population/.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP per capita back
to 1960 from World Development Indicators, World Bank,
Washington, (consulted on March 1st 2017) for all countries
except Taiwan. Data in constant local currency units are con-
verted to US dollars at 2010 exchange rates to give figures in
constant 2010 US dollar terms. Earlier data are taken from
data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre’s
Historical National Accounts (www.ggdc.net/ and www.ggdc.
net/databases/hna.htm) which update data originally produced
by Angus Maddison. Taiwanese data are from World
Economic Outlook Databases for April and October 2016,
International Monetary Fund, Washington supplemented
from Taiwanese sources (National Statistics Republic of
China, www.eng.stat.gov.tw).
Figure 4 Apparent use per capita of finished steel products
from Steel Statistical Yearbook, 2016, World Steel
Association (n.d.), Brussels. Per capita GDP in US Dollars
at purchasing power parity exchange rates taken from World
Economic Outlook Database, October 2016, International
Monetary Fund,Washington. Usage per unit of GDP obtained
by dividing per capita usage by per capita GDP
Figure 5 Cement production fromMinerals Yearbook 2014
(https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/
cement/). Population and per capita GDP in US purchasing
power dollars from World Economic Outlook Database,
October 2016,International Monetary Fund, Washington.
Figures 6 and 7 The shares of Gross Fixed Capital
Formation (GFCF) in GDP at current prices back to 1960
come from World Development Indicators, World Bank for
all countries save Taiwan, whose figures come from the
Taiwanese National Accounts (www.eng.stat.gov.tw). These
shares are applied to GDP per capita, from the sources for
Figs. 1, 2 and 3 to give GFCF per capita. This is divided into
per capita usage of crude steel to give crude steel usage per unit
of GFCF. One weakness is that the price deflators for GDP and
GFCF may follow rather different trajectories, and it would be
more appropriate to use the shares of GFCF at constant prices.
As the figures are only included for illustrative purposes, any
errors are unlikely materially to affect any conclusions.
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